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provocative statement that “it is only a slight exaggeration to say
that we are almost completely ignorant about how the brain pro-
duces mental life” (sect. 1.3, para. 2), G&S make it explicit that we
are currently on much shakier ground than some recent technical
developments, research results, books (e.g., Posner & Raichle
1994), and media coverage might suggest.
G&S argue quite stringently that there is not enough support
for a so-called radical neuron doctrine. A more thorough distinc-
tion between explanatory and descriptive concepts, however, may
reveal the existence of a radical explanatory and a trivial descrip-
tive neuron doctrine in the contemporary mind-related neuro-
sciences. That G&S do not make this distinction becomes evident
when one compares their quotations from the proponents of the
radical doctrine to their objection to them. Whereas the quotations
almost always include the concept of explanation or understand-
ing and also explicitly use these terms (e.g., Churchland & Sejnow-
ski 1992, pp. 3, 239; Crick 1994, p. 7; Snyder 1996, p. 1), G&S’s
“objection is only to the view that the best description . . . will be
entirely neurobiological” (sect. 3.2, para. 1, emphasis added).
The aim of the radical explanatory approach is to reveal the nec-
essary and sufficient neuronal conditions for the mind, that is, to
find the neuronal substrate of the mind. Necessary and sufficient
mean that such explanations make explicit all steps that are in-
volved in some psychological function (e.g., learning) on a neu-
ronal level. Thus, they are radical in G&S’s sense. However, this
does not mean that terms used in psychology or other behavioral
sciences might not be found in the explanation. On the contrary,
they must be, because the “thing” to be explained must be re-
ferred to. Borrowing from Marr’s (1982, p. 27) suggestion that it
is inappropriate to understand bird flight by studying only feath-
ers, it is impossible to explain learning by describing only the 
activities of neurons without referring to the behaviorally overt
processes of learning as well. An example of a neuroscientific ex-
planation is Kandel and coworkers’ (see, e.g., Kandel & Schwartz
1982) detailed report of the neuronal processes that underlie the
phenomenon of a formerly irrelevant stimulus (weak tactile stim-
ulus to the siphon of Aplysia) resulting in a gill-withdrawal reac-
tion. Of course, this explanation does not cover the whole spec-
trum of what psychology calls “classical conditioning,” and it is not
even necessary to relate the explanation to this theory. It explains
only the result of the repeated contiguous presentation of two for-
merly unassociated stimuli.
In most cases, the precursor to the explanatory approach will be
the descriptive one (cf. Reber 1985, p. 191), an approach based on
neuroscientific plausibility that at most reveals the sufficient, but
not the necessary, neuronal conditions of a psychological function.
The descriptive approach analyzes only the neuronal correlates of
the mind and is trivial in that it is the one that the majority of neu-
roscientists, and especially cognitive neuroscientists, must cur-
rently choose. It is to be chosen when some phenomena that are
known on a behavioral level cannot yet be explained or even ob-
served in detail on the neuronal level. One example from de-
scriptive neuroscience is again Kandel and colleagues’ work on
learning mechanisms in Aplysia. They were able to explain in de-
tail the behavioral association of two stimuli by contiguity, but they
have not yet been able to explain or observe some of the more
complex and perhaps more fundamental aspects of classical con-
ditioning, such as the role of informational content of the uncon-
ditioned stimulus (see sect. 5.3.5). Nevertheless, one can easily
theorize about its neuronal basis, which might result in an expla-
nation of the role of informational content. As long as this expla-
nation is not found, however, one must rely on description, with
psychological and neuroscientific accounts of the phenomenon al-
ternating, neither of them dominant.
Until now, and even with the rapid technical development in the
field of behavioral neuroimaging at the close of the “decade of the
brain,” we are still far from purely neuronal explanations of cogni-
tion and behavior. Neuroimaging techniques such as PET and
fMRI might yield more detailed descriptions of what is going on in
the brain during cognitive processing, providing an enormous
amount of exciting new data. However, they give access only to neu-
ronal correlates of the cognitive processes in question (see also
Sarter et al. 1996 and multiple book review of Posner & Raichle’s
Images of Mind BBS 18(2) 1995), and other disciplines, such as psy-
chology and computational modeling, are still necessary to explain
the neuroimaging data themselves. This might be one reason why
Michal Gazzaniga, one of the founders of cognitive neuroscience,
is rather cautious in formulating the present aim of his discipline as
“figuring out how the mind arises from the brain” (Waldrop 1993,
p. 1807) or “how the brain enables the mind” (Gazzaniga 1995, p.
xiii) and only sees the future of his field in “a science that truly re-
lates brain and cognition in a mechanistic way.” Whether or not we
will realize this future some day, I agree with G&S (sect. 5.4.3, para.
5) that the better bet is the descriptive approach.
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Abstract: First, it is not clear from Gold & Stoljar’s definition of biologi-
cal neuroscience whether it includes computational and representational
concepts. If so, then their evaluation of Kandel’s theory is problematic. If
not, then a more direct refutation of the radical neuron doctrine is avail-
able. Second, objections to the psychological sciences might derive not just
from the conflation of the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. There
might also be the implicit belief that, for many mental phenomena, ade-
quate theories must invoke neurophysiological concepts and cannot be
purely psychological.
In presenting the radical neuron doctrine, Gold & Stoljar (G&S)
did not explicitly say whether computational and representational
concepts (CRCs, for short) fall within their definition of biologi-
cal neuroscience; but this is important because these concepts
seem to be indispensable in understanding the function of neural
mechanisms. Without them, we cannot understand how neurons
contribute to information processing in the brain. As a matter of
fact, even the Churchlands appeal to notions such as content-ad-
dressable memory, distributed representations, parallel process-
ing, and vector transformation in articulating their favorite re-
search program. Such concepts obviously cannot be reduced to
neurophysiology, however, as they can also apply to nonbiological
systems. Thus, if CRCs are indeed indispensable, and they fall
outside biological neuroscience, then this is already sufficient to
refute the radical neuron doctrine.
Perhaps G&S meant to include CRCs within biological neuro-
science. However, such a move is likely to weaken their argument
that Kandel’s theory of learning cannot provide a reduction of the
concept of classical conditioning. According to G&S, the current
conception of classical conditioning involves the learning of rela-
tions among represented events. However, this involves the notion
of information about relations that they think cannot be captured in
Kandel’s theory. This might be so, but the issue is whether biologi-
cal neuroscience in principle has the resources to fill the gap. Inso-
far as CRCs are ideally suited for capturing informational concepts,
proponents of the radical doctrine might reply that Kandel’s theory
(or an improved version) can provide a reduction of classical condi-
tioning when embedded within a suitable computational frame-
work, and this enriched theory can still be part of biological neuro-
science in the broad sense. Whether the radical neuron doctrine is
true on this reading would then depend on whether there are psy-
chological concepts that cannot be reduced to CRCs plus other con-
cepts in biological neuroscience. I think that there are indeed many
such concepts, but this is not the place to go into the arguments.
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A related issue arising from G&S’s discussion concerns the re-
lationship between psychological and neurophysiological theories.
G&S seem to think that the latter can at most provide implemen-
tations of the former, and they illustrate their point using the 
theory of color opponency and David Marr’s theory of vision. A
common feature of both examples is that there is a level of psy-
chological theory that can be specified independently of neural
implementation. In the first case it is the theory of the opponent
character of color perception; in the second case it is a theory of
what the visual system computes and why. Interestingly enough,
however, Marr himself cautions that the distinction between com-
putational and implementational theories might not be applicable
to all problems of biological information processing. He says that
“this can happen when a problem is solved by the simultaneous
action of a considerable number of processes, whose interaction
is its own simplest description” (Marr 1977, p. 38 [his emphasis]).
If I understand him correctly, I think his point is that in such sit-
uations, which he calls “Type II” situations, it might be impossible
to find an informative abstract description of what a system does
without mentioning the complex mechanisms involved.
The relevance of Marr’s remark is that it raises the following pos-
sibility: There might be many mental phenomena for which it is im-
possible to devise informative and explanatory theories that are
purely psychological and that do not make use of neurophysiologi-
cal concepts. Let the “substantive neuron doctrine” be the claim
that this possibility does in fact obtain. Of course, even if this doc-
trine were true, it would not vindicate the radical neuron doctrine,
insofar as the mixed theory can contain irreducible psychological
concepts, but this substantive doctrine is not trivial either; it has the
methodological consequence that for some mental phenomena it
would be misguided to try to develop a purely psychological theory.
The point is not just that one has to keep in mind the issue of
neural implementation when devising psychological theories for
these phenomena. Rather the claim is that one cannot begin to for-
mulate an adequate theory without explicitly bringing in neural de-
tails, “getting one’s hands dirty” as it were. It seems to me that a lot
of the rhetoric directed against the psychological sciences might
have to do with the implicit acceptance of this substantive doctrine
and not just the conflation of the radical and the trivial doctrine.
This is one way to interpret what the Churchlands have in mind
when they criticize “autonomous psychology” (McCauley 1996, p.
220). They give the example that the structure of the periodic
table remains a mystery until quantum mechanics enter into the
picture. Likewise, the suggestion might be that many distinctive
features of the mind can be explicated only if we bring in neuro-
physiological findings. Whether this is true is of course an empir-
ical matter. There can be no a priori route to the conclusion that,
say, theories of syntactic principles must somehow bring in neu-
rophysiological concepts if they are to be viable. As with the rest
of science, the ultimate justification for any particular approach
lies in its success, but, whatever the case may be, on this inter-
pretation we need not see those who defend the neuron doctrine
as defending a view that either has no defense or that needs none.
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Abstract: The privileged position of neural activity in biological neuro-
science might be justified on the grounds of the nonlinear and all-or-none
character of neural firing. To justify the neuron doctrine in cognitive neu-
roscience and make it both plausible and radical, we must consider the su-
pervenience of elementary mental properties such as qualia on neural ac-
tivity.
The assumption that neurons are the appropriate level of de-
scription for cortical information processing and mental phenom-
ena in general (the neuron doctrine) is usually regarded as valid.
It is important, however, to question once in a while the very foun-
dation and scope of this doctrine, as Gold & Stoljar (G&S) have
done.
The ultimate reductionist approach to cortical information pro-
cessing would only point to physics, and the ultimate level of de-
scription would be that of elementary particles. From this per-
spective, as G&S remark, neurobiology would be only a “local
stop” (sect. 4.2), so the privileged status of neurons in today’s brain
science cannot be derived from reductionism itself.
How then is neural firing the appropriate level of description in
neuropsychology? From the dynamics point of view, neural activ-
ities are special because of the nonlinearity and all-or-none char-
acter of action potential generation. No subneural processes are
known at present that show the same degree of macroscopic non-
linearity. In addition, in most cases, synaptic interaction is invoked
only when a neuron fires. These are the rationales for treating
neural firing as the only relevant explicit variable in cortical infor-
mation processing. All other variables (including those describing
the subcellular processes) can be treated as implicit variables, af-
fecting cortical information processing only through their effect
on the eventual neural firing. The reductionist would only have to
go as far as neural activity; the rest would be details. Neurobiol-
ogy might be a “local stop,” but it suffices. Treating neural firing
as an explicit variable does not necessarily entail a grandmother
cell-type coding and is, in fact, a generic assumption behind any
model of neural coding. It is in this modern sense that the neuron
doctrine (Barlow 1972) should be interpreted.
The rather simplified but effective treatment of cortical infor-
mation processing in terms of neural activities given above does
leave some very important issues unanswered, as G&S rightly
point out. The main difficulties are in the field of “cognitive neu-
roscience” as opposed to “biological neuroscience” (sect. 2.1).
Here, there is indeed an “ambiguity” in what the neuron doctrine
means (sect. 1.4). If it is claimed that the neuron doctrine is rele-
vant only for the biological neuroscience, fine; it is plausible but
not radical. If it is claimed that the neuron doctrine supersedes the
psychological sciences as well, then it is surely radical, but does
not necessarily sound plausible. What is the neuron doctrine re-
ally supposed to mean in this view?
In my interpretation, the ambiguity could be resolved by con-
sidering the “supervenience” of mental events on neural activities.
Davidson (1970) introduced the concept of supervenience thus:
“Mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or superve-
nient, on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be
taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical
respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object
cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some phys-
ical respect.” To paraphrase, we could hypothesize that there can-
not be two events alike in all neural activities but differing in some
mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental re-
spect without altering in some neural activities. This hypothesis
does sound plausible, and in this sense it is plausible that mental
events should supervene on neural activities. In other words, it
should in principle be possible to explain mental events in terms
of neural activities only, with no extraneous elements needed.
Qualia (Chalmers 1996) come into the picture here. Qualia are
the hallmark of our mental activities, at least as far as conscious
mental activities are concerned. It seems plausible to assume that
a certain quale is invoked in our mind when a certain pattern of
neural firing occurs in the brain. There is certainly the difficult
question of comparing the qualia that two individuals have. We
cannot ever be sure whether the qualia of the red that two sub-
jects have are identical, nor whether such a comparison is mean-
ingful at all. However, it does seem to be plausible that once we
have a specific neural firing pattern in individual subjects’ brains
they will have a certain quale corresponding to that neural activ-
ity. In this sense, qualia would supervene on the neural activities.
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